

# Systematic Audit of Third-Party Android Phones

Michael Mitchell, Guanyu Tian, **Zhi Wang** Florida State University



#### Android Leads Smartphone Market

#### WW Smartphone Sales by OS in 3Q12



• Gartner: "Market Share: Mobile Phones by Region and Country, 3Q12."



#### Android Leads Smartphone Market





- Many manufacturers produce Android phones
  - Samsung, HTC, LG, Motorola, Sony....











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- Hundreds of similar products
  - all Android phones are rather similar, especially in software











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Samsung



HTC



Motor





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  - Android is open any way!







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  - all Android phones are rather similar, especially in software
- Vendors are eager to differentiate by customization
  - Android is open any way!
  - but are they safe???





HTC













 

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 Carrier IQ: The Rootkit Keylogger on Most US Smartphones
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But not it appears on <u>Apple</u>'s iPhones.

Carrier IQ is a piece of software which certain US cellphone networks (Sprint for example) load onto their contract phones before they are released to consumers. The basic stated idea is quite simple: if there are problems then the software generates logs which the network can then analyse to see what the problems are.





#### Table 3. Capability leak results of eight Android-based smartphones (E: explicit leaks; I: implicit leaks)

		HTC					Mot	orola		Samsung			Goog	gle		
Permission	Leg	end	EVC	) 4G	Wild	fire S	Dro	oid	Droi	d X	Epic	4G	Nexu	is One	Nexu	us S
	E	E I		I	E	Ι	E	I	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	I	E	I
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	1	1	1	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	1	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	1	•	1	•		<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	.	•	1	.		•	•			•
CALL_PHONE	•	•	•	•	•	•	.	•	•	•	1	<ul> <li>Image: Image: Ima</li></ul>	•		•	.
CALL_PRIVILEGED		•	•	•	•	✓1	.	•	.	.	.	•	•		.	•
CAMERA	1	•	1	•	1	•	.	•		.	· ·	•	•		· ·	.
DELETE_PACKAGES	✓ <sup>2</sup>	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	✓ <sup>2</sup>	.	<b>√</b> <sup>2</sup>	•	$\checkmark^2$		✓ <sup>2</sup>	•
INSTALL_PACKAGES		•	•	•	· ·	•	.	•	.	.	.	.	•		.	•
MASTER_CLEAR	•	•	•	•	· ·	•	•	.	.	•	1	·	•		.	.
READ_PHONE_STATE	•	1	· ·	1	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	.	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	· ·		•	•	•	•
REBOOT	•	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•	.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
RECORD_AUDIO	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	.	•	•	•	· ·	•	•		•	•
SEND_SMS	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•		•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•
SHUTDOWN	•	•	✓	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Total	6	2	8	2	4	4	1	0	4	0	3	2	1	0	1	0



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ble 3. Canability leak res		<b>b</b>	ht Δ	N	ew Po	sts ased	M	ost P rtnh	opula		Lists expli	cit le	aks	· imp	licit I	eak
				TC				Mot	orola					Good	ule	cun
Permission	Leg	end		) 4G	Wild	fire S	Dro	oid	Droi	d X	Epic	4G	Nexu	is One	Nexi	us S
	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	1	1	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	1	•	•		•	•	•	•
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	<ul> <li>Image: A set of the set of the</li></ul>	· ·	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	-	•	· ·	•	· ·	•	•	·
CALL_PHONE	•	· ·	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	✓		•	•	·
CALL_PRIVILEGED		·	· ·	· ·	•	$\checkmark^1$	· ·	•	•	•	· ·	•	•	•	· ·	·
CAMERA	~	· ·		· ·	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	• 🌡	•	•	•	·
DELETE_PACKAGES	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	· 🕺	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	·
INSTALL_PACKAGES	-	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	· ·	•	· ·	· ]		•	•	·
MASTER_CLEAR	4 -	•	· ·	•	•	•	•	•	· ·	•	1	•		•	•	·
READ_PHONE_STATE	· ·	1	· ·	1	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	· ·	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	•	•	•	·
REBOOT	-	.	1	•		•	•	•		.	.			•	•	.
RECORD_AUDIO	<ul> <li>Image: A set of the set of the</li></ul>	•	1	•	1	•	•	•	•	.	· ·	- 3		•	•	.
SEND_SMS	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	1	•	•	•	•	.	· ·	-	•	•	•	.
SHUTDOWN	-	•	1	•	•	•	•	•	•	.	· ·	- 1		•	•	· ·
Total	6	2	8	2	4	4	1	0	4	0	3	2	1	0	1	0





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			H	TC				Mote	orola		Sams	sung		Goog	gle	
Permission	Lege	end	EVO	) 4G	Wild	fire S	Dro	oid	Droi	d X	Epic	4G	Nexu	s One	Nexu	is S
	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	E	Ι	Е	Ι	E	I
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	1	1	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	• 7
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	1		1			1	•	•	1	•	•	•	-	•	•	•
CALL_PHONE	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	1	1	•	•	•	•
CALL_PRIVILEGED	•			•		$\checkmark^1$	•	•	•	•	•	•	4	•	•	•
CAMERA	1	•	1	•	1		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
DELETE_PACKAGES	$\checkmark^2$		$\checkmark^2$		$\checkmark^2$		$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	✓2	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	✓ <sup>2</sup>	
INSTALL_PACKAGES	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
MASTER_CLEAR	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	1	•	•	•	•	•
READ_PHONE_STATE	•	1	•	1	•	1	•	•	1	•	•	1	•	•	•	- 1
REBOOT	•	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	·	•	•	-	•	•	- 1
RECORD_AUDIO	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
SEND_SMS	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
SHUTDOWN	•	•	1	•	•	-	•	•	•	•	-	•		•	•	-
Total	Total 6 2			2	4	4	1	0	4	0	3	2	1	0	1	0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·										·				FORM		





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			H	TC				Mot	orola		Same	sung		Goog	gle	
Permission	Lege	end	EVO	) 4G	Wild	fire S	Dro	oid	Droi	d X	Epic	4G	Nexu	is One	Nexu	is S
	E	I	E	I	E	Ι	E	I	E	I	E	Ι	Е	Ι	E	I
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	1	1	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	• •
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	1	.	1	•	•	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	.	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•			•	•
CALL_PHONE	•	•	.	•	•	•	.	•	•	.	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	· ·	•	•	•
CALL_PRIVILEGED	•	•	.	•	•	✓1	.	•	•	.	•	•	-	•	•	•
CAMERA	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>		1	•	1	•	.	•	•	.	•	•	•	•	•	- )
DELETE_PACKAGES	$\checkmark^2$		$\checkmark^2$		$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	.	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•	$\checkmark^2$	•
INSTALL_PACKAGES	•		.	•	•	•	.	•	•	.	•	•	•	•	•	
MASTER_CLEAR	•	•	.	•	•	•	.	•	•	.	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	• {	•	•	•	- Å.
READ_PHONE_STATE	•	1	.	1	•	<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>	.	•	1	•	•	🗸 💈		•	•	
REBOOT	•	•	1	•	•	•	.	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
RECORD_AUDIO	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	.	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
SEND_SMS	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	1	•	<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
SHUTDOWN	•	•	1	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	- ;		•	•	•
Total	Total 6 2			2	4	4	1	0	4	0	3	2	1	0	1	0
													Nacional -	Frank		

These vulnerabilities are not in the original Android!!!

# Our Approach



- Systematically compare third-party phones to Google's original releases
  - what changes have been made?
    - especially to the core Android framework and services
  - are these changes safe?
    - if unsafe, can we exploit it (manually)?



#### Why DexDiff



- Android is open-sourced with Apache/BSD/GPL licenses
  - vendors are free to keep changes to framework closed
  - those apps are too large to process manually



See if you can find the eight differences.

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- Most Android apps are Java-based in **Dalvik** bytecode
  - no systems available to compare Dalvik binaries
  - complimentary to systems for native binaries (BinHunt, BinDiff...)



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#### DexDiff Overview

- Input: two Android (Java) apps
- Output: differences between these two apps



#### DexDiff Overview

- Input: two Android (Java) apps
- Output: differences between these two apps
- Process:
  - parse the apps into Java classes
  - find matching classes pairs of matched classes
  - find matching methods in them methods
  - construct CFGs for matched methods
  - compare CFGs (graph isomorphism)



#### DexDiff Sample Output





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# DexDiff Sample Output





- Parse the (two) Android binaries into classes
  - official Gingerbread (2.3.3) framework.dex: **3924** classes
  - HTC EVO 4G framework.dex: 5423 classes



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  - calculate string similarity using n-gram
- Find a matching that maximizes overall similarity
  - Hungarian algorithm



Convert classes into string arrays



- Convert classes into string arrays
  - each terminal in the BNF is a string (semantic unit)





- Convert classes into string arrays
  - each terminal in the BNF is a string (semantic unit)
  - registers are omitted for instructions
    - e.g., new-array v0, v1 [Ljava/lang/String;
    - Java: late-binding in types retained in bytecodes

$$\begin{array}{cccc} C & \rightarrow & class\_name \cdot superclass\_name \cdot I\_List \cdot F\_List \cdot M\_List \\ I\_List & \rightarrow & I\_List \cdot I \\ & I & \rightarrow & interface\_signature \cdot interface\_name \\ F\_List & \rightarrow & F\_List \cdot F \\ & F & \rightarrow & field\_type \cdot field\_name \\ & M\_List & \rightarrow & M\_List \cdot M \\ & M & \rightarrow & method\_signature \cdot method\_name \cdot INST\_List \\ & INST\_List & \rightarrow & INST\_List \cdot instruction \end{array}$$



- Slide a window of *n* on the array, step one at a time
- Each window of data (strings) is a *n*-gram
  - e.g., 2-gram set of abcd: {ab, bc, cd}

2-gram set of adbc: {ad, db, bc}

• Similarity of class a and b:

$$Similarity(c_a, c_b) = \frac{|c_a \cap c_b|}{|c_a \cup c_b|}$$



- However, string comparison is slow
  - framework.dex: 3924 classes v.s 5423 classes

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- However, string comparison is slow
  - framework.dex: 3924 classes v.s 5423 classes
- Apply a hash function to n-grams
  - feature hashing
- Calculate similarity with hash values

$$Similarity(c_a, c_b) = \frac{|c_a \cap c_b|}{|c_a \cup c_b|}$$



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  - n workers and n tasks, find an optimal (least cost/most benefit) assignment of the workers to the tasks



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- Hungarian algorithm solves the assignment problem
  - n workers and n tasks, find an optimal (least cost/most benefit) assignment of the workers to the tasks
- DexDiff uses it to find a matching of classes to maximize total similarity
- Output: pairs of matched classes

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# Matching Methods

- Input: a pair of matched classes
- Output: pairs of matched methods in these classes



# Matching Methods

- Input: a pair of matched classes
- · Output: pairs of matched methods in these classes
- Method: the same as matching classes
  - calculate a matrix of similarity scores for methods
  - apply Hungarian algorithm for a maximal matching



# Constructing CFGs

- A normal CFG construction algorithm
  - break methods into basic blocks
  - link basic blocks together



# Constructing CFGs

- A normal CFG construction algorithm
  - break methods into basic blocks
  - link basic blocks together
- Hungarian algorithm **cannot** be used to match BBs
  - many basic blocks are similar to each other
  - connectivity of CFGs should be used to refine results



# Comparing CFGs

• Input: two CFGs



- Input: two CFGs
- Output: maximum common isomorphic sub-graphs
  - unmatched nodes are BBs modified, inserted, or deleted



- Input: two CFGs
- Output: maximum common isomorphic sub-graphs
  - unmatched nodes are BBs modified, inserted, or deleted
- Maximum sub-graph isomorphism is NP-complete
  - efficient algorithm exists for two similar graphs
  - two inputs in DexDiff are similar

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D)

1:	procedure $BACKTRACK(\mathcal{D})$
2:	if EXTENDABLE( $\mathcal{D}$ ) then
3:	$v = \text{PickNode}(\mathcal{D})$
4:	$\mathcal{Z} = \text{GetMappableNodes}(v,$
5:	for all $w \in \mathbb{Z}$ do
6:	$\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M} + \{(v, w)\}$
7:	$\mathcal{D}' = \operatorname{Refine}(\mathcal{D})$
8:	BACKTRACK( $\mathcal{D}'$ )
9:	$\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M} - \{(v, w)\}$
10:	end for
11:	$\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{V} - \{v\}$
12:	BACKTRACK( $\mathcal{D}$ )
13:	$\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{V} + \{v\}$
14:	else if $ \mathcal{M}  >  \mathcal{R} $ then
15:	$\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{M}$
16:	end if
17.	end procedure

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- Backtracking is a brute-force algorithm
  - it converges fast if **Refine** can quickly prune dead trees

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- Backtracking is a brute-force algorithm
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- Timeout is used to prevent waiting for too long
  - limit the number of recursive calls (1 million)
  - 38 timeouts out of 6560 CFG pairs (0.58%) for framework.dex

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- Backtracking is a brute-force algorithm
  - it converges fast if **Refine** can quickly prune dead trees
- Timeout is used to prevent waiting for too long
  - limit the number of recursive calls (1 million)
  - 38 timeouts out of 6560 CFG pairs (0.58%) for framework.dex
- Leading causes of timeout
  - large CFGs with many unmatched basic blocks
  - many identical basic blocks (switch/exception)
  - nodes with many similar parents/children

#### Implementation



- Implemented in 13.5K lines of "C" source code
- Use "dot" to generate CFGs side-by-side
  - matching is efficient, "dot" is slow

# Evaluation



- Experiments with HTC EVO 4G
  - Carrier IQ: details of information collection in the browser
    - subsequently removed in a firmware update
    - a hook in com.android.calculator2.CalculatorImageButton.onTouch survives
  - Vulnerable device management app (newly discovered with DexDiff)
    - local app with INTERNET access can obtain private information, install/delete apps, wipe/lock/brick the phone



Namo	Base				Phone	;	Mo	dified	N	lew	Time
INAILLE	Size	Class#	Method#	Size	Class#	Method#	Class#	Method#	Class#	Method#	Time
am	25K	6	38	26K	6	39	1	1	0	1	0.10
policy	179K	96	833	258K	140	1,200	29	105	44	368	10.23
test.runner	172K	105	1,001	172K	105	1,002	2	1	0	1	0.17
bmgr	12K	2	25	14K	2	27	1	2	0	2	0.05
bouncycastle	678K	507	3,186	677K	507	3,186	31	47	0	0	1.37
location	6.3K	4	56	6.3K	4	56	0	0	0	0	0.01
core	4.1M	3,009	27,952	4.1M	3,017	28,093	353	1264	8	141	17.04
core-junit	21K	19	142	21K	19	142	0	0	0	0	0.05
ext	1.2M	960	6,896	1.2M	960	6896	209	468	0	0	40.01
framework	6.6M	3,924	38,283	9.9M	5,423	52,566	1,198	4,556	1,504	14,290	144.70
ime	5.6K	1	10	5.6K	1	10	0	0	0	0	0.03
input	3.6K	1	7	3.6K	1	7	0	0	0	0	0.01
javax	53K	24	164	53K	24	164	2	9	0	0	6.55
monkey	79K	50	237	76K	50	237	1	1	0	0	0.17
pm	25K	7	43	25K	7	43	1	2	0	0	0.09
services	1.3M	437	4,014	1.7M	531	5,153	124	384	95	1,139	159.86
sqlite-jdbc	130K	29	858	130K	29	858	3	16	0	0	2.49
svc	7K	6	26	7.3K	6	26	1	1	0	0	0.03



Namo	Base				Phone	;	Mo	dified	N	lew	Time
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ime	5.6K	1	10	5.6K	1	10	0	0	0	0	0.03
input	3.6K	1	7	3.6K	1	7	0	0	0	0	0.01
javax	53K	24	164	53K	24	164	2	9	0	0	6.55
monkey	79K	50	237	76K	50	237	1	1	0	0	0.17
pm	25K	7	43	25K	7	43	1	2	0	0	0.09
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Namo	Base				Phone	;	Mo	dified	N	lew	Time
INALLIC	Size	Class#	Method#	Size	Class#	Method#	Class#	Method#	Class#	Method#	Time
am	25K	6	38	26K	6	39	1	1	0	1	0.10
policy	179K	96	833	258K	140	1,200	29	105	44	368	10.23
test.runner	172K	105	1,001	172K	105	1,002	2	1	0	1	0.17
bmgr	12K	2	25	14K	2	27	1	2	0	2	0.05
bouncycastle	678K	507	3,186	677K	507	3,186	31	47	0	0	1.37
location	6.3K	4	56	6.3K	4	56	0	0	0	0	0.01
core	4.1M	3,009	27,952	4.1M	3,017	28,093	353	1264	8	141	17.04
core-junit	21K	19	142	21K	19	142	0	0	0	Ũ	0.05
ext	1.2M	960	6,896	1.2M	960	6896	209	468	0	0	40.01
framework	6.6M	3,924	38,283	9.9M	5,423	52,566	1,198	4,556	1,504	14,290	144.70
ime	5.6K	1	10	5.6K	1	10	0	0	0	0	0.03
input	3.6K	1	7	3.6K	1	7	0	0	0	0	0.01
javax	53K	24	164	53K	24	164	2	9	0	0	6.55
monkey	79K	50	237	76K	50	237	1	1	0	0	0.17
$\mathbf{pm}$	25K	7	43	25K	7	43	1	2	0	0	0.09
services	1.3M	437	4,014	1.7M	531	5,153	124	384	95	1,139	159.86
sqlite-jdbc	130K	29	858	130K	29	858	3	16	0	0	2.49
svc	7K	6	26	7.3K	6	26	1	1	0	0	0.03



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svc	7K	6	26	7.3K	6	26	1	1	0	0	0.03



#### **Processing Time**





#### Carrier IQ Hooks in Browser

Hook	Methods (Hooking Points)
callBrowserStopLoading	BrowserActivity.stopLoading
callOnPageStarted	Tab\$2.onPageStarted
callOnProgressChanged	Tab\$3.onProgressChanged
callOnReceivedError	Tab\$2.onReceivedError
callOnReceivedTitle	Tab\$3.onReceivedTitle
	BrowserActivity.onOptionsItemSelected
callDeloadDage	BrowserActivity.resumeBrowser
calliceloadr age	BrowserActivity\$StopLoadingPageTimer.ResumeLoadingPage
	htc.ui.HtcTitleBar.onClick
callUserCancel	BrowserActivity.onKeyUp
callUserCancel	BrowserActivity.onOptionsItemSelected



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callOnReceivedError	Tab\$2.onReceivedError
callOnReceivedTitle	Tab\$3.onReceivedTitle
callReloadPage	BrowserActivity.onOptionsItemSelected
	BrowserActivity.resumeBrowser
	BrowserActivity\$StopLoadingPageTimer.ResumeLoadingPage
	htc.ui.HtcTitleBar.onClick
callUserCancel	BrowserActivity.onKeyUp
	BrowserActivity.onOptionsItemSelected



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# Vulnerable Device Management App

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  - void broadcastKeyinEvent (boolean); void broadcastMotionEvent (boolean); void broadcastTrackballEvent(boolean);



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# Vulnerable Device Management App

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- Protected by vendor permissions
  - e.g., com.htc.Manifest.permission.BROADCAST\_KEYIN\_EVENT
- Used only by /system/app/HtcDm.apk
  - system management app, can install/delete apps, factory reset...
    - dangerous functionalities are unimplemented yet
  - no authentication at all
    - any local app with network permission can send commands to it

#### Thank you!