CNT4406/5412 Network Security IPsec

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Fall 2014

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IPsec is a protocol suite for securing IP communication by authenticating and encrypting each IP packet of a session.

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- IPsec is implemented in the kernel, applications may remain unchanged

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- IPsec can provide authentication and/or confidentiality
- IPsec is implemented in the kernel, applications may remain unchanged
- IPsec can be configured to be transparent to users

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Introduction...

Why do we need IPsec?

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Introduction...

Why do we need IPsec?

• IPv4 has no authentication or integrity protection

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Introduction...

Why do we need IPsec?

IPv4 has no authentication or integrity protection
 IP spoofing, payload modification, lack of accountability

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- IPv4 has no authentication or integrity protection
 IP spoofing, payload modification, lack of accountability
- IPv4 has no confidentiality protection
 - eavesdropping

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• SPD: Security Policy Database



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- SPD: Security Policy Database
- IKE: Internet Key Exchange III to negotiate security parameters



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- SPD: Security Policy Database
- IKE: Internet Key Exchange I to negotiate security parameters
- SA & SAD: Security Association (Database)



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- SPD: Security Policy Database
- IKE: Internet Key Exchange I to negotiate security parameters
- SA & SAD: Security Association (Database)
- IPsec: Authentication Header/Encapsulating Security Payload
 - \blacksquare AH \rightarrow authentication
 - \blacksquare ESP \rightarrow encryption and/or authentication



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A IPsec security association is a cryptographically protected connection



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- A SA has a set of security parameters (attributes)
 e.g., identities, algorithms, keys, sequence number
 - ➡ SA specifies how to process IPsec packets



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- SA is unidirectional, two SAs for a conversation
- SA may be changed during the conversation (IKE rekeying)



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Security Parameter Index (SPI)

$\ensuremath{\textbf{SPI}}$ is a 32-bit number assigned to a SA

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IPsec

Security Parameter Index (SPI)

SPI is a 32-bit number assigned to a SA

• SPI is chosen by the destination of a SA

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- A SA is uniquely identified by < SPI, destination addr, AH or ESP >
 SPI may overlap for unicast and multicast addresses
 - SPI may overlap for AH and ESP

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- SPI is chosen by the destination of a SA
- A SA is uniquely identified by < SPI, destination addr, AH or ESP >
 SPI may overlap for unicast and multicast addresses
 SPI may overlap for AH and ESP
- SPI is carried in each AH and ESP header
 the receiver can look up the SA for the packet in its SAD
 - the SA determines how to process the packet

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Security Association Database

• SAs are stored in the security association database

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IPsec

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- SAs are stored in the security association database
- SAD can be searched with < SPI, destination addr, AH or ESP >
 SA specifies how to send packets or process received packets

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IPsec

• Each host/gateway participating in IPsec maintains its own SAD

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Security Policy Database

SPD is a database of policies to process packets: drop, send w/ IPsec? ...

Security Policy Database

SPD is a database of policies to process packets: drop, send w/ IPsec? ... ■ SPD policy has a selector and action, similar to the firewall policy

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Index	Local	Remote	Proto	Dir	Action	SA In/Out
9	1.1.1.12:80	2.2.1.0/24:any	TCP	I/O	IPsec	sa15/sa25
8	1.1.1.0/24:any	2.2.1.0/24:any	any	I/O	IPsec	sa10/sa20
				I		
				0	drop	null
0	any	any	any	I/O	bypass	null



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IPsec Outbound Processing



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IPsec Inbound Processing



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IPsec can operate in tunnel mode and transport mode

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IPsec can operate in tunnel mode and transport mode

Tunnel mode:

 \bullet the original IP packet is enclosed in an outer IP header w/ ESP/AH

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Tunnel mode:

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- commonly used in firewall to firewall or endnode to firewall

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IPsec can operate in tunnel mode and transport mode

Tunnel mode:

- $\bullet\,$ the original IP packet is enclosed in an outer IP header w/ ESP/AH
- commonly used in firewall to firewall or endnode to firewall
 data is only protected inside the tunnel (not end-to-end)

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Tunnel Mode ...

• Two firewalls establish an encrypted tunnel across the Internet

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Tunnel Mode ...

- Two firewalls establish an encrypted tunnel across the Internet
- IPsec packets from F_1 to F_2 have a destination of F_2

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Tunnel Mode ...

- Two firewalls establish an encrypted tunnel across the Internet
- IPsec packets from F₁ to F₂ have a destination of F₂
 the inner IP packet is not changed

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• IPsec header is inserted after the IP header of the original packet

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- IPsec header is inserted after the IP header of the original packet
- Commonly applied end-to-end, data is protected end-to-end

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- Transport mode is not strictly necessary, tunnel mode can be used

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- IPsec header is inserted after the IP header of the original packet
- Commonly applied end-to-end, data is protected end-to-end
- Transport mode is not strictly necessary, tunnel mode can be used
 tunnel mode uses more header space

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IP Header

• Protocol: what protocol follows the IP header

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IP Header

- Protocol: what protocol follows the IP header
 - → common protocols: TCP(6), UDP(17), IP(4), ESP(50), AH(51)

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IP Header

- Protocol: what protocol follows the IP header
 - common protocols: TCP(6), UDP(17), IP(4), ESP(50), AH(51)
 - ➡ protocol headers in IPv6 are TLV-encoded

Version	/ersion IHL Type of service		Total length	
Identification			D M Fragment offset	
Time to live		Protocol	Header checksum	
		Source	e address	
		Destinat	ion address	
		Ontions (0)	or more words)	

AH header provides authentication only, not encryption

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AH header provides authentication only, not encryption

- AH header has variable length (which field?)
 sequence number: sequence number of AH packets
 - ICV: integrity check value for the data

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- ICV covers both data and immutable or predictable fields in IP header
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 - immutable fields: version, total length (what if fragmented?)...

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• AH covers both data and part of the IP header, problems?

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- ICV before data prevents streamlining AH head process
 NIC needs to cache the whole packet, cannot send-as-you-go

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- ICV before data prevents streamlining AH head process
 NIC needs to cache the whole packet, cannot send-as-you-go
- AH can only do authentication and it duplicates functionality in ESP

IPsec **IPsec Operation**

Encapsulating Security Payload

ESP always has an encryption operation, and also supports authentication

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Encapsulating Security Payload

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Encapsulating Security Payload

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ESP puts information before and after the data (sandwiching)
 ICV after the data avoids caching whole packet before sending it

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Encapsulating Security Payload

ESP always has an encryption operation, and also supports authentication special null encryption if encryption is not needed

- ESP puts information before and after the data (sandwiching)
 ICV after the data avoids caching whole packet before sending it
- Data is padded to fit the cipher's block size

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Summary

- IPsec Architecture
- IPsec Modes
- AH and ESP
- Next lecture: IPsec/IKE

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