

# CIS 4360, SPRING 2026

## PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

VIET TUNG HOANG

The slides are loosely based on material from Prof. Mihir Bellare (UCSD) and Prof. Stefano Tessaro (UW).


# Agenda

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**1. Certificate Authority (CA)**

**2. Dealing with Rogue CAs**


# Previously



Alice generates a pair of secret key and public key.


She keeps  $sk$  to herself, and stores  $pk$  in a public, trusted database.

# Problem



The adversary may replace Alice's real key with its fake one

# Solution



# An Example of X.509 Certificate

|                                |                                                          |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Subject Name</b>            |                                                          |
| <b>Country</b>                 | US                                                       |
| <b>State/Province</b>          | CA                                                       |
| <b>Locality</b>                | Menlo Park                                               |
| <b>Organization</b>            | Facebook, Inc.                                           |
| <b>Common Name</b>             | *.facebook.com                                           |
| <br><b>Issuer Name</b>         |                                                          |
| <b>Country</b>                 | US                                                       |
| <b>Organization</b>            | DigiCert Inc                                             |
| <b>Organizational Unit</b>     | www.digicert.com                                         |
| <b>Common Name</b>             | DigiCert SHA2 High Assurance Server CA                   |
| <br><b>Serial Number</b>       | 0E CB 09 39 B2 B1 01 54 B8 95 70 C7 B2 2B 7A 47          |
| <b>Version</b>                 | 3                                                        |
| <br><b>Signature Algorithm</b> | SHA-256 with RSA Encryption<br>( 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 ) |

PKCS#1 signature  
with SHA-256

# An Example of X.509 Certificate


ElGammal on  
EC group




|                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Not Valid Before | Wednesday, August 27, 2014 at 5:00:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time                                                                                                                                                            |
| Not Valid After  | Friday, December 30, 2016 at 4:00:00 AM Pacific Standard Time                                                                                                                                                             |
| <hr/>            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Public Key Info  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Algorithm        | Elliptic Curve Public Key ( 1.2.840.10045.2.1 )                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Parameters       | Elliptic Curve secp256r1 ( 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 )                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Public Key       | 65 bytes : 04 D8 D1 DD 35 BD E2 59 B6 FB 9B 1F 54<br>15 8C DB BF 4E 58 BD 47 BE B8 10 FC 22 E9 D2 9E<br>98 F8 49 2A 25 FB 94 46 E4 42 99 84 50 1C 5F 01<br>FD 14 25 31 5C 4E D9 64 FD C5 0C B3 46 D2 A1 BC<br>70 B4 87 8E |
| Key Size         | 256 bits                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Key Usage        | Encrypt, Verify, Derive                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Signature        | 256 bytes : AA 91 AE 52 01 8C 60 F6 02 B6 94 EB<br>AF 6E EB DD 3C C8 E1 6F 17 AB B8 28 80 EC DC 54<br>82 56 24 C1 16 08 E1 C2 C8 3E 3C 0F 53 18 40 7F<br>DF 41 36 93 95 5F B1 D9 35 43 5E 94 60 F9 D6 A7...               |

# Certificate Chain

CA hierarchy




User's certificate




Only need to know public key  
of root CAs to verify


# Certificate Chain Example




# Certificate Chain Example



# Certificate Chain Example



# Usability Issue



Modern browsers complain if certificates are not valid

But users still can bypass the warning, and many people do



Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are still a threat on large scale

# Real-world MITM Attacks

[https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/new\\_nsa\\_leak\\_sh.html](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/new_nsa_leak_sh.html)

[Blog >](#)

## New NSA Leak Shows MITM Attacks Against Major Internet Services

The Brazilian television show "Fantastico" exposed an NSA training presentation that discusses how the agency runs man-in-the-middle attacks on the Internet. The point of the story was that the NSA engages in economic espionage against Petrobras, the Brazilian giant oil company, but I'm more interested in the tactical details.

The video on the webpage is long, and includes what I would consider to be a fairly standard NSA classroom, but a few screen shots are important. The first screen shot shows a slide from the NSA presentation that details how the NSA's MITM attack works:

However, in some cases GCHQ and the NSA have chosen a more controversial route -- on at least one occasion, the NSA has attacked Google directly by performing a man-in-the-middle attack on Google's SSL security certificates. One document published by the NSA presentation that also contains some Google "done" to apparently snoop on SSL traffic. The NSA presentation also discusses how the NSA performs man-in-the-middle attacks on other major Internet services, including Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2014-09



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Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (CET)

① www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2014-09&post=Analysis-of-Chinese-MITM-on-Goo

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Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT)

## Analysis of Chinese MITM on Google

*The Chinese are running a MITM attack on SSL encrypted traffic between Chinese universities and Google. We've performed technical analysis of the attack, on request from GreatFire.org, and can confirm that it is a real SSL MITM against www.google.com and that it is being performed from within China.*

We were contacted by GreatFire.org yesterday (September 3) with a request to analyze two packet captures from suspected MITM-attacks before they finalized their blog post. The conclusions from our analysis is now published as part of GreatFire.org's great blog post titled "[Authorities launch man-in-the-middle attack on Google](#)".

# Agenda

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1. Certificate Authority (CA)

**2. Dealing with Rogue CAs**

# When CAs Get Hacked

## Comodo hacker: I hacked DigiNotar too; other CAs breached

The hacker behind this year's

PETER BRIGHT - 9/6/2011, 5:36 PM

**Digital certificate breach at Indian authority also targeted Yahoo domains, possibly others**

The full scope of the security breach is currently unknown, a Google security engineer said

[Lucian Constantin \(IDG News Service\)](#) on 11 July, 2014 01:22

## VeriSign issues fraudulent Microsoft certificates

[John Fontana \(Computerworld\)](#)

26 March, 2001 11:09

# Certificate Pinning

DigiCert CA

**Want:** Only accepts Facebook certificate from DigiCert



**Approach 1:** Advertise via HTTPs Header:

-SHA-256(DigiCert cert)


-Validity period

Cert of DigiCert from root CA, not Facebook's cert

**Approach 2:**

Pre-configure browsers

# Certificate Revocation




- One should download CRL from CA before validating cert
- Before Alice trusts Bob, she should make sure he's not in the CRL

# Improve Bandwidth Efficiency

- CLR is huge → bandwidth issue

- **Solution:** Online querying



# Where to Download CLR or Query?

Information can be found in certificate

|           |                                                                                                             |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Extension | CRL Distribution Points ( 2.5.29.31 )                                                                       |
| Critical  | NO                                                                                                          |
| URI       | <a href="http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g5.crl">http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g5.crl</a> |
| URI       | <a href="http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g5.crl">http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ha-server-g5.crl</a> |

URL to download CRL

|           |                                                                   |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Extension | Certificate Authority Information Access<br>( 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 ) |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|

Critical NO

|           |                                                              |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Method #1 | Online Certificate Status Protocol<br>( 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 ) |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|

URI <http://ocsp.digicert.com>

URL to query