CIS 5371, FALL 2025

DIGITAL SIGNATURE

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The slides are loosely based on those of Prof. Mihir Bellare, UC San Diego.

Agenda


1. High-level Overview

2. Building Signature Scheme

The Need For Signing Is Ubiquitous

THE CHEQUE PAPER CONTAINS COLORED MICROPRINTING AND WATERMARK, PROTECTED BY THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. John Smith CHECK Nº 0007 765 Dolor sit Amet APT B5 DATE: aug. 11, 2019 Brooklyn, NY, 12345 PAY TO THE ORDER OF: <u>Mary Johnson</u> Seven hundred fifteen and # 715,39 DOLLARS PAYABLE AT ALL LOREM BANK BRANCHES IN USA ACCOUNT Nº 001234567 MEMO Monthly rent 2. Smith AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE that as Free and Independent States, they have full Bower to lovy Mar, conclude Seare, contract Alliances, establish Commerce , and to do all other Ucts and Hunge which Independent _ And for the fupport of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of devine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Sives, our Fortunes States may of right do . _ and our facred Honor de Josiah Bartlets Show morris Jon Hooper Jareph Heures, John Pinn M. Whipple Bonjamin Mush Jan' Adams Button Guinmits Lyman Hall. Geo Walton. Tranklin Saan Linu Samuch Charon John Adams Rot Freas Painte John Morton The Stones Elbridge Gerry Charles Carroll of Cargollin Edward gutledge 1. Ja! Smithing Step Hopkins 450 Jaylor ames Wilson William Ellery 6 That long wards Jund. Thomas Lynch Jun. George Withe Richard Henry Lee Proger Sherman ra! Hopkingon Sam " Huntington Arthun Middleton Th Gasar Money-Mon Milliams Benj Harrisone Oliver Wohn Clark Abra moran Matthew Thornton Garler Bracton -


How To Sign Electronically?



Lots of apps to digitize signatures

Problem: A digitized signature is easily copied \rightarrow forgery

Digital Signature Scheme: Syntax



Digital Signature versus MAC

MAC

- Verifier needs to share a secret key with signer
- Verifier can impersonate signer


Digital Signature

- Verifier needs no secret

- Verifier cannot impersonate signer

Digital Signature: Unforgeability Security

- Similar to MAC security
- **Difference**: The adversary is given the public key



Agenda

1.High-level Overview

2.Building Signature Scheme

A Bad Scheme: Plain RSA Signature

Key generation: Like RSA encryption

Sign:

- To sign a message, "decrypt" it:

Verify:


- To verify a signature, "encrypt" it and compare with the message

Issues with Plain RSA Signature

- Feasibility: Can sign only short messages


- Security: Can easily break unforgeability security

No sign query needed!




Practice: Forging Plain RSA For Targeted Msg

Goal: The forged message must be a **specific** one



Hash-then-Sign Paradigm

Plain RSA Signature → Full Domain Hash (FDH)



Question: How to verify?


Security Requirement for Hash Function

What intuition suggests: Hash must be collision-resistant


If H(M) = H(M') then M and M' have the same signature

What proof requires: Hash is modeled as a random oracle

A Gap of Demand and Supply




A Common Wrong Way to Hash



Broken by Desmedt and Odlyzko in 1985

How to Hash Properly



Use the first $m = \lceil \log_2(N) \rceil$ bits and take mod N

Hashing in PKCS#1

