Authenticated Encryption

Viet Tung Hoang

Agenda

1. AE and Its Security Definitions

2. Failed Ways to Build AE

3. Generic Compositions

4. Padding-Oracle Attack on SSL/TLS

Motivation: Challenge-Response Revisited



Question: Break this identification mechanism if encryption is CTR.

Solution: Authenticated Encryption

Transfer $5 to account 12345

K

K

K

Privacy — **Authenticity**

Encryption scheme

Authenticated Encryption
Achieve **both** of these aims

MAC

Authenticated Encryption (AE)

Emerged ~ 2000

Begin with two **realizations**

1. Authenticity is routinely needed/assumed
2. "Standard" privacy mechanisms don't provide it

↓

Provide an easier-to-correctly-use abstraction boundary

AE Syntax



Key Gen
$\mathcal{K}$
$
K
Encrypt
M
$\mathcal{E}$
$
C
K
Decrypt
C
$\mathcal{D}$
M
or ⊥
K
Decryption may reject invalid ciphertexts

Defining Security for AE

Authenticity

-Use Left-or-Right security for privacy

$\text{Auth}_{\mathcal{E}}$

procedure Initialize()
$K \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathcal{K}$

procedure Enc(M)
Return $\mathcal{E}_K(M)$

procedure Finalize(C')
Return $(\mathcal{D}_K(C') \neq \perp)$



Must never receive from Enc

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{T}}(A) = \Pr[\text{Auth}^{A}_{\mathcal{E}} \Rightarrow 1]$$

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Plain Encryption Doesn't Provide Authenticity



Question: Does CBC provide authenticity?

Answer: No, because any ciphertext has valid decryption

A Bad Fix: CBC with Redundancy



On decryption, verify the decrypted last block is zero.

Question: Break the authenticity of this scheme with a single Enc query

An Attack



Enc
C_0 C_1 C_2 C_3
$\mathcal{A}$
M_1 0^n
C_0 C_1 C_2
C_0 M_1 0^n 0^n
E_K E_K E_K
C_1 C_2 C_3
C_1 C_2
E_K^{-1} E_K^{-1}
C_0
M_1 0^n

Complex Redundancy Doesn't Help

Some (unkeyed) "redundancy" function, such as checksum



The redundancy is verified upon decryption

Question: Break the authenticity of this scheme with a single Enc query

An Attack



Enc
M
M₁
h(M₁)
C₀ C₁ C₂ C₃
A
C₀ C₁ C₂
C₀
M₁
h(M₁)
h(M)
E_K
E_K
E_K
C₁ C₂ C₃
C₁ C₂
E_K^{-1}
E_K^{-1}
C₀
M₁
h(M₁)

A Case Study: WEP

Used in IEEE WiFi standard

24-bit IV is a part

of the ciphertext



Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV



Assume all messages are of the same length, and fairly long

Goal: recover at least one message

Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV



Aim for an IV collision

For 24-bit IV's, how many ctx to wait for collision prob ≈ 0.5?

Attack 1: Exploiting Short IV





Same IV, can recover $M_1 \oplus M_2$

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack



Goal: recover the underlying message by exploiting Dec queries

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack

Illustrated Via A Simpler Variant of WEP



Example: $\text{Parity}(10011) = 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 1$

Attack 2: Chop-Chop Attack
Illustrated For 4-bit Message



Decryption CloseUp



Compare with $\text{Parity}(M_1 M_2 M_3)$

Exploit Decryption Response



If valid, $M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = 0$

Exploit Decryption Response



If invalid, $M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = 1$

Exploit Decryption Response



Exploit Decryption Even Further



Solve A System of Linear Equations

$$\begin{cases} M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 \oplus M_4 = \square \\ M_1 \oplus M_2 \oplus M_3 = \square \\ M_1 \oplus M_2 = \square \\ M_1 = \square \end{cases}$$

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3. **Generic Compositions**

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Constructing AE: Generic Composition



Method	Usage
Encrypt-and-MAC	SSH
MAC-then-Encrypt	SSL/TLS
Encrypt-then-MAC	IPSec

Encrypt-and-MAC: Simple Composition



Privacy	Authenticity
No	No

for some bad encryption scheme

No privacy: encrypting the same message results in the same tag

No authenticity if one can modify C such that decryption is unchanged.

Encrypt-and-MAC in SSH

Privacy	Authenticity
Yes	Yes



MAC-then-Encrypt



Privacy	**Authenticity**
Yes	No

for some bad encryption scheme

No authenticity if one can modify C such that decryption is unchanged.

MAC-then-Encrypt in TLS



Privacy	Authenticity
Yes	Yes

Encrypt-then-MAC



Privacy	**Authenticity**
Yes	Yes

A Common Pitfall in Implementing EtM

Happened in ISO 1972 standard, and in RNCryptor of iOS



Forget to feed IV into MAC

Break auth with one query

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4. **Padding-Oracle Attack on SSL/TLS**

The Padding-Oracle Attack

"Lucky Thirteen" attack snarfs cookies protected by SSL encryption

Exploit is the latest to subvert crypto used to secure Web transactions.

by D

Meaner POODLE bug that bypasses TLS crypto bites 10 percent of websites

Some of the world's leading sites are vulnerable to an easier, more simplified attack.

by D

Researchers poke hole in custom crypto built for Amazon Web Services

Even when engineers do everything by the book, secure crypto is still hard.

by D

New TLS encryption-busting attack also impacts the newer TLS 1.3

Researchers discover yet another Bleichenbacher attack variation (yawn!).

Attack Model: Chosen Prefix Secret Suffix



Goal: Recover M

This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL



This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL



This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL

M

encrypted

GET /AA cookie: M

bank.com

attacker.com

This Model Is Realistic: Attacking SSL



Enc oracle

Dec oracle

Encryption In SSL: MAC-then-Encrypt



Padding In SSL Encryption

block length is 16 bytes

Consider byte strings only



The Attack in Action

Illustration For Two-block Message



Aim: Recover the message byte by byte

Recover Last Byte of First Block



Recover Last Byte of First Block



CBC Decryption



$$V = M_1 \oplus C_0 \oplus C_3$$



To pass MAC check, want the last byte of V to be 15

Pass with prob ~ 1/256

Exploit Decryption Output



If valid, last byte of $V = M_1 \oplus C_0 \oplus C_3$ is 15

Learn last byte of M_1

Exploit Decryption Output



After t attempts, succeed with prob $\sim 1-(1-1/256)^t$ times

Patching Via Different Padding



Secure if implement properly

Careless Implementation Leads To Attack



-**Secure** if return a single error signal

-**Broken** if tell what kind of error it is.

Scanning For Vulnerable Implementations

"Given final block not properly padded"

Spring boot | Eclipse | PKCS12 | Javax | Java | Intellij | Android Studio | Images | AES

About 16,000 results (0.32 seconds)

Stack Overflow
https://stackoverflow.com › questions › given-final-bl...

Given final block not properly padded - java

Nov 8, 2011 — BadPaddingException: **Given final block not properly padded**. Such issues can arise if a bad key is used during decryption.

7 answers · Top answer: If you try to decrypt PKCS5-padded data with the wrong key, and then ...

Given final block not properly padded exception - Stack Overflow — Apr 11, 2018
Given final block not properly padded. AES Decryption - Stack ... — Nov 13, 2022
Given final block not properly padded. Such issues can arise if ... — Jul 10, 2020
"Get Key Failed: **Given final block not properly padded**" when I ... — Sep 22, 2021
More results from stackoverflow.com

Implementation Is Hard: Timing Leakage



Source: Canvel et al, CRYPTO 2003

How To Attack

Illustration For Two-block Message



Recover Last Byte of Second Block



CBC Decryption



$$V = M_2 \oplus C_1 \oplus R$$



If V ends with a zero byte

Bad tag signal