Firewalls

First notions

Types of outsider attacks

• Intrusions
  – Data compromise
    • confidentiality, integrity
  – Web defacement
    • availability, reputation
  – Zombie recruitment
    • DOS, liability risk
• Denial of Service Attacks
• Sniffing/Information theft
Why firewalls?

• Against firewalls:
  – Host security measures are effective
  – Firewalls increase Internet latency, and impose arbitrary limitations on legitimate Internet usage

• Against host-based security only:
  – Administratively hard to enforce consistency
  – Firewalls may actually increase internal available bandwidth by blocking bad traffic

• Scalability: network vs. host security model
Firewalls can

- Enforce security policies to decide which traffic to allow and to not allow through the fire-walled channel
- Log security-related information
- Reduce the visibility of the network

Firewalls cannot

- Prevent against previously unknown attack types
- Protect against insiders/connections that do not go through it.
- Provide full protection against viruses.
Services typically protected

- HTTP/HTTPS
- FTP
- SSH
- SMTP
- DNS

Firewall Configurations
Single-Box Architectures

• Simple to manage, available from vendors
• Single point-of-failure, no defense-in-depth
• Types:
  – Screening Router
  – Dual-homed host

Screening Router

Routes or blocks packets, as determined by site’s security policy.

Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al.
Screened Subnet Architectures

• Adds an extra layer of security to screened host
  – Perimeter network isolates internal network from Internet
  – Components:
    • Perimeter network
    • bastion host
    • internal router
    • external router
Services on the Bastion Host

• Incoming connections from the Internet:
  – DNS queries
  – FTP download queries
  – Incoming mail (SMTP) sessions

• Outgoing connections protected either by:
  – Packet filtering (direct access to the Internet via screening routers)
  – Proxy services on bastion host(s)

Split-screened subnet

Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al.
Variations

• For high performance, use multiple bastion hosts
• Ok to merge a bastion host with an external router
• Not Ok to merge a bastion host with an internal router
• Bad to have multiple interior routers on the same perimeter network
Internal Firewalls

Picture from textbook: Building firewalls, by Zwicki et al.
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